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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XIX FEBRUARY, 1934 NUMBER 2
EXCULPATORY CLAUSES IN CORPORATE
MORTGAGES AND OTHER INSTRUVIENTS
PHILIP M. PAYNEt
The modem corporate trust deed is in many respects sui generis.'
Mortgages of corporations are usually in the form of trust deeds,
with a power of sale, in which a trustee (generally a trust company)
is named to take and hold the title of the mortgaged property for
the benefit of the bondholders. The bonds are made negotiable
so that they may be conveniently disposed of in the market, and
the mortgage is, in effect, a contract between the corporation making
it and the trustee, as representing all persons who may become
holders of the bonds secured by it.2 The modem corporate trust
deed retains characteristics of a trust, but it is distinguished from
a real or true trust, by the fact that the corpus-the incumbered
property-frequently remains in the possession and under the
control of the borrower.3 There is a marked distinction between
a mortgage trustee and an ordinary trustee.4 And there is a vital
difference between the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee and that
tMember of the New York Bar.
'Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 252 (1879); Shaw v. Little Rock & Fort Smith
R. Co., ioo U. S. 6o5, 612 (x879); Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 3o9 U. S. 4o,
403, 3 Sup. Ct. 304 (I883). Cf. In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., L. R.
(1925) Ch 'Div. 532, 549.
2Miles v. Vivian, 79 Fed. 848, 851 (C. C. A. 2d., 1897); Carter v. Fortney, 370
Fed. 463, 469 (C. C., W. Va., i909).
3Smith, A Forgotten Chapter in the Early History of the Corporate Deed, (1927)
61 Am. L. REv. 900,903; Hazeltine, The Gage of Land in Medieval England (I9O4),
18 HARV. L. Rxv. 36, 43; Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, (1890) 4 HARv. L.
REv. i, ii. See also, Miami Valley Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mills, 357 App. Div. 542,
549, x42 N. Y. Supp. 862 (ist Dept. 1913), modified 216 N. Y. 687, 13o N. E. 1o44
(1915).
4King v. Merchant's Exchange Co., 5 N. Y. 547, 557 (1851). In. Gilfillan v.
Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 401, 403-4, 3 Sup. Ct. 304 (1883) Chief Justice Waite
said: "The mortgage, with the issue and distribution of bonds under it, creates
a trust, of which the selected trustee, or his duly constituted successor, is the
trustee, and the bondholders primarily, and the stockholders ultimately, the
beneficiaries." See also May Aug Lumber Co. v. Scranton Trust Co., 240 Pa. St.
5oo, 5o4, 87 Atl. 843 (1913), ANN. CAS. x915A 235; James v. Cowing, 82 N. Y.
449, 453 (188o); Butterfield v. Cowing, 112 N. Y. 486, 491, 20 N. E. 369 (3889);
Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon Street Corp., 237 App. Div. 789, 792,
263 N.Y. Supp. 359,362 (2d Dept. 1933). Cf. Marion Mortgage Co. v. Edmunds,
64 F. (2d) 248, 253 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
'7'
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of trustee and cestui que trust.5 The trustee in a corporate mortgage
is a trustee of an express trust as to the security but not as to the
bonds or notes, for they are not payable to the trustee.6 It is ele-
mental that the trustee, named in a trust deed securing a bond issue,
represents alt the bondholders in matters affecting the- enforcement
of the security and the administration of the trust property)' Like-
wise there is a fiduciary relation between co-bondholders; they are
co-cestuis que trust under the trust deed."
The foregoing distinctions are fundamental. While the relation-
ship between the trustee and the bondholders may not be entirely
analogous ,to that existing between an ordinary trustee and his
cestui que trust,9 a majority of the courts seem to imply certain
'Ashhurst v. Montour Iron Co., 35 Pa. St. 30, 42 (186o); Spruill v. Ballard,58 F. (2d) 517, 519 (App. D. C., 1932).
6Fitkin v. C ntuiry Oil Co., I6 F. (2d) 22, 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Mackay v.
Randolph Madon Coal Co., 178 Fed. 881, 885 (C. C. A. 8th, 191o).
7Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. New Orleans Drainage
Co., 278 Fed. 811, 814 (D. C. La., 1922); Baker v. Central Trust Co., 235 Fed. 17
(C. C. A. 6th, 1916); Lidgerwood v. Hale & Kilburr Corp., 47 F. (2d) 318, 320
(D. C. N. Y., 1930); First National Bank of Boston v. Proctor, 40 F. (2d) 841,
843 (C. C. A. 1st, 193o), certiorari denied 282 U. S. 863 (1930).
8Booker v. Crocker, 132 Fed. 7, 8 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o4); Jackson v. Ludeling,
21 Wall. (U. S.) 616, 622 (1874); Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., IO9 U. S. 4Ol,
403, 3 Sup. Ct. 304 (1883); Toler v. East Tennessee, etc., Ry. Co., 67 Fed. I68,
i8o (C. C. Tenn., 1894); Lloyd v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 65 Fed. 351, 357 (C. C.
Ky., 1895). Cf. Sage v. Central Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 334, 338 (1878); Brooks v.
Vermont Central R. Co., 22 Fed. 211,2 12 (C. C.Vt., 1884); Bound v. South Carolina
Ry. CO., 71 Fed. 53, 55 (C. C. S. C., x895), aff'd 78 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 4th, 1897).
gThere are two views as to the nature of the interest of a cestui que trust: a. The
right to enforce the performance of the trust in equity. Stone, The Nature of
the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, (1917) 17 COL. L. REV. 467; Ames, Purchaser
for Value without Notice, (1888) I HARV. L. REV. 1, 9; HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) 24, I06; Book review by Dean Pound, (1912) 26
HARV. L. REV. 462, 464; see also, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone
in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 95, 96, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 6I
(1929); Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U. S. 20,25, 53 Sup. Ct. 417 (1933); Melenky
v. Melen, 233 N. Y. 19, 22, 134 N. E. 822 (1922); Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y.
357,376 (1882); Gilman v. Reddington, 24 N. Y. 9, 15-16 (1861); Coster v. Loril-
lard, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 265, 304 (1835); People ex rel. Brooklyn Trust Co. v.
Loughman, 226 App. Div. 41, 234 N. Y. Supp. 336 (3d Dept. 1929) affirmed
251 N. Y. 569, 168 N. E. 430 (1929); Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 316, 321, 50
N. E. 967, 41 L. R. A. 395 (1898); Archer-Shee v. Garland, L. R. [1931] A. C.
212; Buckmaster v. Harrop, 7 Ves. Jr. 341, 32 Eng. Rep. 139 (18o2); In re
Dolan's Estate, 79 Cal. 65, 2r Pac. 545 (1889); Culbertson v. Whitbeck Co.,
127 U. S. 326, 334,8 Sup. Ct. 1136 (1888); Blew v. McClelland, 29 Mo. 304
(1860); (1923) 22 MIcH. L. REv. 834.
b. Property, an equitable estate. Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui
Que Trust, (1917) 17 Col. L. R. 269; See also, the dissenting opinion of Mr.
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powers and duties from the relation of the parties to the trust fund,
irrespective of the terms and provisions of the trust indenture.10
Other courts have taken the position that the trustee has no duties
outside of those specified in the indenture and that the liability of
the trustee of a corporate mortgage is determined by the terms
and provisions of the mortgage itself. Under this view the courts
do not impose additional duties and obligations upon the trustee
over and above the terms of the corporate mortgage." Consequently
it cannot be regarded as a settled point that the liability of such
Justice Holmes in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, supra at 96, 50 Sup.
Sup. Ct. 59, 62 (1929); Hunt v. Perry. I65 Mass. 287, 291, 43 N. E. 107
(1896); Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 16, 40 Sup. Ct. 417 (1920), affirming
230 Mass. 503, 12o N. E. 162 (1918);Brandies v. Cochrane, 112 U. S. 344, 351,
5 Sup. Ct. 194 (1884); McCeney v. Prince George's County, 153 Md. 25, 137
Atl. 291 (1927); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. I918) § 975.
1 Sturges v. Knapp, 31 Vt. 1, 52 (1858); Merrill v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 24 Hun (N. Y.) 297, 299 (1881); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Portland, etc.,
R. Co., io Fed. 6o4, 6o5 (C. C. N. H., 1882); Frishmuth v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 95 Fed. 5, 8 (C. C. N. Y., 1899), af'd. 107 Fed. 169 (C. C. A. 2d,
19oi); Rhinelander v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 519, 535, 65 N. E.
499 (1902); Patterson v. Guardian Trust Co., 144 App. Div. 863, 866, 129 N. Y.
Supp. 807 (3d. Dept. I9II); Miles v. Vivian, 79 Fed. 848, 851 (C. C. A. 2d,
1897); Guardian Trust Co., v. White Cliffs Portland Cement & Chalk Co., IO9
Fed. 523, 527 (C. C. Ark., 19oI); New York Trust Co. v. Michigan Traction Co.,
193 Fed. 175, 18o (D. C. Mich., 1912); Sprigg v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 206 Pa.
St. 548, 555, 56 Atl. 33, 36 (1903); First National Bank v. Salisbury, 13o Mass.
303, 310 (1881); Welch v. Northern Bank & Trust Co., oo Wash. 349, 170 Pac.
1029 (igi8); Moyer v. Norristown-Penn Trust CO., 296 Pa. 26, 30, 145 Atl. 682
(1929); Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix National Bank, 253 N. Y. 369,376, 171 N. E.
574 (1930); Hoffman v. First Bond & Mtge. Co., II6 Conn. 320, 164 Atl. 656
(1933); 2 PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 750; Posner, Liability of the Trustee
under the Corporate Mortgage Indenture, (1928) 42 HARV. L. REV. 198, 244.
"National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 78 Fed. 428, 434 (C. C. Mo.,
1896); Fleisher v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 58 App. Div. 473, 482, 69 N. Y.
Supp. 437 (ist Dept. IgoI); Tschetinian v. City Trust Co., 97 App. Div. 38o,
383, 89 N. Y. Supp. 1053 (2d. Dept., 19o4) aff'd. 186 N. Y. 432, 436, 79 N. E.
4oi (19o6); Havana Electric Railway Co. v. Central Trust Co., 122 App. Div.
829, 832,107 N. Y. Supp. 68o (Ist. Dept. 1907), afTd. 197 N. Y. 534,91 N. E. 1114
(i9io); Davidge v. Guardian Trust Co., 2o3 N. Y. 331, 340,96 N. E. 751 (1911);
Colorado & Southern Ry. Co., v. Blair, 214 N. Y. 497, 510, io8 N. E. 840 (1915),
ANN. CAs. x916D 1177; Meisel v. Central Trust Co., 179 App. Div. 795, 799,
167 N. Y. Supp. 143 (1st. Dept. 1917), afl'd. 223 N.Y. 589, 119 N. E. IO59 (1918);
Green v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 233 App. Div. 12, 15, 227 N. Y. Supp.
252, 256 (3d. Dept., 1928), a'd. 248 N. Y. 627, 162 N. E. 552 (1928); cf. N. Y.
L. J., Nov. 24, 1923; Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260, 265, 174
N. E. 648 (i93i); Ainsa v. Mercantile Trust Co., 174 Cal. 504, 163 Pac. 898
(1917); Shroeder v. Arcade Theatre Co., 175 Wis. 79, IO4, 184 N. W. 542, 552
(1921); Newhall v. Morristown Trust Co., 280 Pa. 195, 198, 124 Atl. 337, 338
(1924); Bangs, The Powers and Duties of a Trust Company when acting as Trustee
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a trustee depends upon contract.2 The best opinion would seem
to be that it does not, and cannot depend upon contract." Never-
theless, the trust deed may be regarded as the basis of the trustee's
liability in equity, and in that respect the liability is closely analogous
to a contract liability regarded from the viewpoint of equity juris-
prudence. 14
We have seen that the modern corporate trust deed is somewhat
different from the private trust. 5 Certainly the trustee in a cor-
porate mortgage securing bonds, like any trustee, owes to all parties
concerned the duty of acting in good faith and of exercising all
discretion vested in it by the mortgage in a proper and open manner. 6
under a Corporation Mortgage, (I898) 15 BANK L. J. 79; Herrick, Trust Depart-
ments in Banks and Trust Companies, (1925) 264; Fowler, Legal Responsibility of
Trustees under Corporate Bonds and Mortgages, or Deeds of Trust, (1890) 24
AM. L.REv. 703, 718.
l2Cf. National Trust Co. v. Whicher, L. R. [3912] A. C. 377, 383; cf. Fowler,
Legal Responsibility of Trustees under Corporate Bonds and Mortgages, or Deeds
of Trust, supra note ii.
Treating the trustee's duties as contractual, the trustee's obligation is a
common-law obligation and enforceable in an action at law. On the other hand,
if a trust relationship exists,'the trustee's duties are measured not only by what
is expressly provided by the trust deed, but also by the duties which the law
imposes. See the authorities cited supra note 4. Thus, if the trust relation
exists, the trustee is governed by the general rules that govern trustees in the
ordinary performance of the duties of a trust. Moyer v. Norristown-Penn Trust
Co., 296 Pa. 26, 3o, 145 Atl. 682 (1929). Although equity deals with special
cases, it applies general principles. Carpenter v. Danford, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 581,
586 (1868).
13Maitland thinks "we shall go on treating the law of trusts as something
distinct from the law of contracts". EQUITY (1929 ed.) 54. However, the his-
torical distinction is increasingly less important. BOGEaT, TPUSTS (1921) 40-42.
4Fowler, Legal Responsibility of Trustees under Corporate Bonds and Mortgages,
or Deeds of Trust, supra note I I. In Fidelity Insurance, Trust & Safe Deposit
Co. v. Shenandoah Valley R. R. Co., 32 W. Va. 244, 264, 9 S. E. 180, 187 (1889)
the Court said that the terms of a corporate mortgage are "a positive contract
between the grantor, the trustee and the bondholders".
If the trustee acquires the whole estate in law and in equity and the bond-
holder has no estate or interest in the corpus and the interest of the bondholder
is regarded as merely a personal claim against the trustee-a chose in action-
to enforce the performance of the trust in equity (supra, note 9), the trustee's
obligations are more analogous to those assumed by contract than those implied
by law by virtue of a trust relationship between the trustee and the bondholder.
15The nature of the corporate mortgage in the lightof its origin and develop-
ment and its purpose and function has been considered elsewhere. (Note) Im-
munity Clauses in Corporate Trust Indentures, 0933) 33 COL. L. REV. 97;
Draper, A Historical Introduction to the Corporate Mortgage, (1930) 2 RoCKY MT.
L. REV. 71; Shinn, Exoneration Clauses in Trust Indentures, (1932) 42 YALE L. J.,
359, 372.
"'Speers Sand & Clay Works v. American Trust Co., 2o F. (2d) 333, 335 (C. C.
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May the trustee under a corporate trust deed exempt itself from
the obligations of using care in the performance of its duties as
trustee or limit its liability by an exculpatory clause? While a breach
of trust is considered as a simple contract debt, 7 the general law as
to limiting one's liability by contract is not settled. Exculpatory
clauses are not new.'8 An exculpatory clause is one of discharge
and indemnity; it is designed to avoid the responsibility which the
trustee would be under, were it not for the clause. Such clauses
in corporate mortgages are not against public policy, 9 unless they
seek to protect the trustee from liability for acts of gross negligence,
willful default or for acts done in bad faith.2 0 In Industrial & General
Trust, Ltd. v. Tod,2' Judge Varn said:
"No covenant of immunity can be drawn that will protect a
person who acts in bad faith, because such a stipulation is
against public policy, and the courts will not enforce it. The
law requires the exercise of good faith, and no matter how strong
the provision to shield from liability may be, there is no protec-
tion unless good faith is observed."
The cases seem to indicate that a trustee has the right by con-
tract to limit somewhat the duties which it is to perform under the
corporate indenture; and, in some instances, the trustee can be held
liable for nonfeasance of such duties only as the trustee agreed to
perform.22 However, there is a dictum" to the effect that the excul-
A. 4th, 1927); Pollemus v. Holland Trust Co., 6I N. J. Eq. 654 47, Atl. 417
(i9OO); Struthers Coal & Coke Co. v. Union Trust Co., 227 Pa. 29, 75 Atl. 986
(I91O); Murdock v. Woodson, 2 Dill. 188, 203, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,942 (C. C.
Mo., x873) aff'd 22 Wall (U. S.) 351 (1874).17Vernon v. Vawdry, 2 Atk. I29, 26 Eng. Rep.'474 (1740).
18Cf. Bartlett v. Hodgson, i T. R. 42, 99 Eng. Rep. 962 (1785).
19Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260, 174 N. E. 648 (1931); Bell v.
Title Trust & Guarantee Co., 292 Pa. 228, 24o Atl. 90o (1928). See also, Kirshen-
baum v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N. Y. 489, i8O N. E. 245 (1932),
noted (2932) 42 YALE L. 3. 139. Contra: Green v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,
123 Misc. 731, 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 836 (2924), aff'd without opinion 213 App. Div.
855, 2o8 N. Y. Supp. 870 (Ist. Dept. 1925); see also same case upon second
appeal, 223 App. Div. 12, 227 N. Y. Supp. 252 (ist. Dept. 1928), aff'd 248 N. Y.
627, 162 N. E. 552 (2928).
20Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321,.324 (C. C. A. 3d, 2918), cer-
tiorari denied 248 U. S. 564 (I918); In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., L. R.
[1925] Ch. Div. 532.
2128o N. Y. 216, 225, 73 N. E. 7, 12 (I905).
22Green v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., N. Y. L. 3. of Nov. 24, 1923, opinion
by Lehman, 3., infra note 47.
"Green v. Title Guarantee & Trust CO., 223 App. Div. 12, 16, 227 N. Y. Supp.
252 (ist Dept. 1928). aff'd without opinion 248 N. Y. 627, 262 N. E. 552 (2928),
noted (1928) 28 COL. L. Rlv. 829. Cf. First National Ins. Co., v. Salisbury, 230
Mass. 303, 312 (1881).
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patory clause cannot avail the trustee so as to excuse it from doing
something which was absolutely necessary to the preservation
of the lien of the mortgage. The scope and effect of the exculpatory
or immunity clause is illustrated by the following cases:
A. CoRPoRATE TRUST DEEDS
The recent case of Harvey v. Guaranty Trust Co.25 was an action
by a bondholder against the trustee of a corporate deed of trust
for damages as a result of wrongfully satisfying the mortgage.
The indenture exempted the trustee for responsibility "except for
its own fraud or willful misconduct". It also provided that the
certificate of the mortgagor would be conclusive evidence of facts
relied upon by the trustee in acting as trustee. Nowhere in the
indenture was there any express provision for the authentication
by the trustee of duplicate bonds or for the delivery of a satisfaction
of the mortgage upon payment of the bonds or otherwise. The
mortgagor elected to redeem the outstanding bonds exclusive of
those held by the plaintiff, the whereabouts of which were unknown
and were said to have been lost. The mortgagor requested the trus-
tee to issue duplicate bonds and furnished the trustee with certificates
for such purpose, together with an indemnity bond. The trustee
authenticated duplicate bonds which were in the mortgagor's
treasury. Thereupon the mortgagor redeemed all the bonds, except
those held by the plaintiff for which duplicate ones had been issued
to the mortgagor company. The trustee executed and delivered a
satisfaction of the trust indenture. The plaintiff maintained that
the trustee's conduct constituted a breach of trust because the
trustee had been placed on notice that the alleged lost bonds might
be outstanding in the hands of bona fide holders, since the affidavit
of the treasurer that no coupons on any of the bonds alleged to
have been lost had been paid for ten years was incorrect as shown
by the records of the trustee. Moreover, the records of the mortgagor
showed that plaintiff held the bonds. Under such circumstances
the exculpatory provisions of the indenture were held unavailable
to the trustee. Frankenthaler, J. said at p. 425:
"Fairly construed, the exemption of the trustee *** from
liability 'for anything whatever in respect to the premises or the
trust hereby created, except its own fraud or willful misconduct'
appears to apply only to those matters specifically referred
to in the instrument itself. The indenture under consideration
21e. g  file and refile as a chattel mortgage.
25I34 Misc. 417, 236 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1929), aff'd 229 App. Div. 774, 242 N. Y.
Supp. 9o5 (1st Dept. 1930), aff'd 256 N. Y. 526, 177 N. E. 125 (1931).
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contained no provision requiring or permitting the trustee to
satisfy it. On the contrary, it expressly dispensed with the
necessity of a formal satisfaction. Nor was there any authority
granted to authenticate duplicate bonds or coupons. Assuming,
however, that the exemption clause is regarded as applicable
to the situation here presented, I am of the opinion that it cannot
properly be given effect. The tendency of our courts appears
to be in the direction of refusing to permit such an exculpatory
provision to prevail where the misconduct of the trustee is so
repugnant to the trust as to defeat its very purpose. * * *
"Even if the view be taken that the exculpatory provision
is not only applicable here but also effective, it seems to me that
it is not going too far to characterize the trustee's action as
'willful misconduct' within the meaning of the indenture. It
was certainly 'willful'misconduct' in the sense of an unauthorized
and wrongful act, deliberately and intentionally done w th
knowledge that not all the original bonds and coupons had
been surrendered and with an appreciation of the possibility
that they might be in the hands of innocent holders for value."
Moreover, in addition to the "willful misconduct" of the trustee,2
the Court also held that the reasons which rendered the exculpatory
clause inapplicable and ineffective in connection with the satisfaction
of the indenture govern with equal force respecting the authentica-
tion and delivery of the duplicate bonds. The affidavit of the treas-
urer of the mortgagor accompanying the certificate was inadequate,
being mere hearsay information. The Court, in referring to the
provision of the indenture respecting the conclusive nature of
certificates delivered to the trustee, said at p. 428:
"Moreover, it is difficult to believe that the provision under
discussion could have been intended to permit the trustee to
satisfy the indenture solely on the basis of the mortgagor's
statement that all outstanding bonds had been paid. An inter-
pretation to that effect would practically nullify the indenture
by destroying the only real reason for its existence. The court
should not be astute to extend and enlarge the natural meaning
of the language used by adopting a construction so opposed
to the very sense of the trust instrument, so fraught with
danger to the bondholders. Indeed, one cannot but entertain
grave doubt that even an express permission to satisfy on the
mortgagor's statement would be given effect, for reasons similar
to those advanced in connection with the 'willful misconduct'
clause."
In Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Saint Paul Trust Co. 27 the trust
deed provided that the trustee of a corporate mortgage should not
26The meaning of the term "willful misconduct" will be discussed infra. See
note 113.
27185 Minn. 25, 239 N. W. 766 (i93i).
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be "liable for the performance of any duty or responsibility, nor
shall it * * * in any event be subjected to any liability not herein
expressly stated and hereby imposed upon said trustee." The trus-
tee received money from a sale of a part of the mortgaged property.
In an action by the successor trustee against its predecessor for an
accounting, the trustee asserted that it had delivered the money
to the mortgagor. From the report of the case it does not appear
that the trustee could, under the terms of the instrument, release
any part of the security to the mortgagor. The record did not show
that the mortgagor had received the money and the trustee was held
liable for the money it actually received. The exculpatory provisions
did not release the trustee from such liability.
In Doyle. v. Chatham &? Phenix National Bank s the plaintiff, a
bondholder, recovered damages in an action against the trustee
for losses sustained on the ground that the trustee's certificates of
authentication 'were issued negligently and without authority, and
that thereby the plaintiff was induced to acquire worthless bonds.
The indenture authorized the trustee to authenticate bonds when
specified collateral had been pledged with it. Securities of a different
nature were deposited with the trustee and were accepted by the
trustee without obtaining, although the indenture permitted,
certificates from the appropriate officers of the mortgagor corpora-
tion as to the pertinent data regarding such collateral. The trustee
was deemed negligent and held to have certified the bonds without
authority and in so doing it was guilty of a misrepresentation of
fact which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss. The
exculpatory clause was held inapplicable.
Richardson v. Union Mortgage Co.2 19 was a suit in equity against
the trustee of a mortgage. The trust deed did not authorize sub-
stitutions of pledged securities. The trust deed contained an excul-
patory clause freeing the trustee from liability for errors in judgment.
The trustee permitted replacements of securities; and, in so doing
was held to have transcended its powers. Consequently, its judg-
ment had no basis upon which to operate, and the exculpatory clause
relied upon by the trustee was held to have no application.
In Leeds City Brewery, Ltd. v. Plotts0 an action was brought
2s253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930), 71 A. L. R. 1405 (1931) and annotation
p. 1414, supplementing annotation in 57 A. L. R. 470 (1929); noted (1930) 40
YALE L. J. 138 and (1930) 15 MINN. L. REV. 477; commented upon (1930)
29 MIcH. L. REV. 355, 359 and (1930) 5 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. Io8, III. The case
is distinguished in Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260, 264, 174 N. E.
648 (193) infra note 43.
292b0 Iowa 346, 228 N. W. 103 (1930). 30L. R. [1925] Ch. Div. 532.
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against the trustees of a debenture trust deed to recover damages
for an alleged breach of trust. The deed provided (p. 544) that the
"trustee shall not be responsible for the consequences of any mistake
or oversight or error of judgment or forgetfulness or want of prudence
on the part of the trustees or trustee or of any attorney receiver
or other person appointed by them or him hereunder". The clause
'was held (p. 544) not to protect the trustees against willful breach of
trust.31
Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co.32 is a leading case,3 in which the
trust agreement provided that the mortgagor would assign to the
trustee bonds and mortgages guaranteed by another corporation,
whereupon the trustee might certify bonds under the, trust deed.
The trustee accepted bonds secured by mortgages upon lands of
the mortgagor, rather than bonds and mortgages owned by the
mortgagor and assigned to the trustee. The trustee was held to
be without authority to execute the certificates and was liable to
the bondholders irrespective of the exculpatory clause. Vice-Chan-
cellor Learning said:
"It accordingly seems impossible to construe an immunity
clause as intended to exempt a trustee from liability for tran-
scending his powers as clearly defined by the trust agreement;
his engagement is to exercise the powers, and only the powers
conferred upon him, and the appropriate office and purpose of
an immunity clause forming a part of a trust agreement which
specifically and clearly defines the trustee's powers appears to be
to limit his responsibility in matters of judgment and discretion
committed to him in the execution of those defined powers."
(p.461).
Thus, the court predicated the right of the bondholders to recover
damages from the trustee, on account of its unauthorized certifica-
tion, upon a breach of the duty owed by the trustee to the bond-
holders as cestui que trustent.3 4
In Hunsberger v. Guaranty Trust Co.,3" the trustee, having certain
securities in its possession for the protection of the bondholders,
under the terms of the mortgage, agreed to the substitution in
place thereof of new securities which upon their face did not comply
3""Willful misconduct" will be discussed infra. See note 113.
"288 N. J. Eq. 450, 1o2 Atl. 844, aff'd 89 N. J. Eq. 584, io6 Atl. 890 (1917).
"See, Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix National Bank, supra, note 28. Cf., (I93O)
5 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. io8, IIO; (1930) 29 MICH. L. REv. 355, 361; (1930) 15
MINN. L. REV. 477; (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 829, 830.
UTo like effect, see Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617 (1883), infra note 4o.
35164 App. Div. 74o, ISo N.Y. Supp. I9O (ist. Dept. 1914), a d on opinion of
Dowling, J., below, 218 N. Y. 742, 113 N. E. io58 (1916).
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
with the terms of the agreement. The deed of trust contained an
exculpatory clause. The Appellate Division held that a question
of fact was presented for the determination by the jury as to whether
the trustee was guilty of gross negligence in accepting the substituted
security and ordered a new trial. On a stipulation, the Court of
Appeals entered judgment absolute against the trustee.
The trustee in Colonial Trust Co's. Appeal"5 had certain funds
representing the proceeds of securities in its possession for the pro
rata benefit of the bondholders. The funds were delivered to the
mortgagor company by the trustee for the payment of treasury
bonds. Holding this constituted gross neglect or willful default,
the court surcharged the trustee, saying that "the lawful claims of
the bondholders are not to be refused on account of a mistake of this
nature by the trustee."
The exculpatory clause in Patterson v. Guardian Trust Co. 37 was
identical with that in Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co.,18 as appears
from an examination of the record on appeal. The trustee failed to
see that the proceeds of the sale of the bonds were applied to the
extinguishment of prior mortgages. This amounted to a breach of
duty which the court held was implied from the trust relationship.
And in Mullen v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co. 9 the exculpatory
clause was held "not to refer in any way to the act of the trustee in
authenticating" spurious bonds.
While Tuttle v. Gilmore4 0 did not involve a corporate mortgage,
reference is made to it at this point since it is a leading case.4' The
trustee's failure to make proper examination and inquiry respecting
certain investments was held such neglect as amounted to a "willful
and intentional breach, of trust" within the meaning of the excul-
patory clause in the deed of trust. The trustee accepted second
mortgages and this constituted an affirmative act in disregard of
certain obvious facts which showed that such action might result
in loss to the cestui que trust. The Court was of the opinion that
such a clause of limitation should be strictly construed.4
3'241 Pa. 554, 88 Ati. 798 (1913).
37144 App. Div. 863, 129 N. Y. Supp. 807 (3d. Dept. x911).
3825o Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918), certiorari denied 248 U. S. 564,39 Sup. Ct. 9
(1918).
30io8 Me. 498, 81 Atl. 948 (1911).
4.36 N. J. Eq. 617 (1883).
"1Cf. Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., supra note 38; Conover v. Guarantee
Trust Co., supra note 32; Woodruff v. Freehold Trust Co., 112 N. J. Eq. 4o5,
164 AtI. 411 (1933), infra note 69.
4236 N. J. Eq. 617, 622 (1883). To like effect, see Rehden v. Wesley, 29
Beav. 213, 54 Eng. Rep. 6o9 (186i).
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Turning now to a consideration of the cases in which the excul-
patory clause effectually shielded the trustee from liability, we find
Benton v. Safe Deposit Ban 4 which presented the question of the
liability of a trustee under a corporate mortgage to the bondholders
for failure to record the mortgage. The indenture stated that the
trustee was under no duty to record the same and further provided
that the "trustee, save for its gross negligence or willful default,
shall not be personally liable for any loss or damages." The lower
court" was of the opinion that the provisions relieving the trustee
from the duty of recording the instrument and from negligence
were against the public policy of the State of New York. The Court
of Appeals, however, held that the law of Pennsylvania was appli-
cable and by that law no liability attached by reason of the alleged
negligence; the contract specifying the trustee's duties and obliga-
tions as well as its liability being legal.
In Secirity Building Corp. v. Title and Trust Co.,46 certain rentals
were pledged as additional security for the payment of the bonds.
The mortgage provided that the trustee should be under no obliga-
tion to take any action likely to involve expense until it was indenni-
fled; and further provided that the trustee should not be liable for
mistakes or errors of judgment or otherwise in connection with the
trust, except for gross negligence or willful and intentional default.
In an action against the trustee to recover damages on account of
its alleged negligence in failing to collect certain rentals, the trustee
was held not liable, except for improper application of rentals actually
received.
Green v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.4 7 was vigorously contested.
Plaintiff, the owner of a large number of bonds, brought an action
for damages against the trustee named in the mortgage for various
derelictions on its part, including gross negligence as a trustee in
failing to refile the mortgage each year in order to keep it alive as
a chattel mortgage. The mortgage provided that "the trustee is
under no obligation to record or file this indenture in any office
whatsoever or to procure any additional instrument or further
assurance or to do any act for the continuance or conservation of the
lien hereof or for giving notice of the existence of such lien." The
43255 N. Y. 26o, i74 N. E. 648 (1931). The Benton case distinguishes the Doyle
case, supra note 28 and follows the Browning case, infra note 58.
44229 App. Div. 851;,243 N. Y. Supp. 8o6 (ist. Dept. 1930).
45Bell v. Title Trust & Guarantee CO., 292 Pa. 228, 235, 14o Atl. 9oo, 902,
57 A. L. R. 463 (1928) infra, note 53; Byers v. Union Trust Co., 175 Pa. 318,
34 Atl. 629 (1896).
SI31 Ore. 624, 284 Pac. 175 (930). 477o N. Y. L. J. 681, Nov. 24, 1923.
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complaint was dismissed since the allegation of gross negligence was
insufficient. Mr. Justice Lehman said:
"Obviously, the defendant can be held liable for' damages
to the plaintiff only if these damages occur as a result of the
failure of the defendant to perform some duty which it owed
to the plaintiff as a bondholder. The defendant's duties as
trustee arise out of and are governed by the mortgage or deed
of trust. * * * the defendant was bound to exercise due care
in carrying out both the duties expressly assumed by it in the
deed of trust and the duties impliedly assumed by it from the
mere fact of its becoming a trustee. It may be liable for damages
caused by any failure to perform such duties properly, * * *
There may be question as to how far a trustee may exempt him-
self from the obligations of using care in the performance of his
duty as trustee, but in my opinion there can be no serious
doubt that a trustee has the right by contract to limit the duties
which he is to perform and can be held liable for nonfeasance
of such duties only as the trustee agreed to perform. In the
present complaint the only allegation of negligence is for non-
feasance of duties which the defendant had not agreed to
perform."
Subsequently the complaint was amended and the defendant's motion
for judgment on the pleadings was denied.48 The Appellate Division
affirmed without opinion.4 Thereafter there was a trial which re-
sulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. Upon appeal, the Appellate
Division reversed the judgment and dismissed the complaint, 0
holding the exculpatory clause valid. Finally, the Court of Appeals
affirmed without opinion.5 And a motion for reargument was denied.62
In Bell v. Title Trust & Guarantee Co." the mortgage declared
that the trustee should be under no obligation to see to the recording
of the indenture. It was not recorded and it was held "that no will-
ful breach of trust, false statement or gross negligence on the part
of the trustee has been shown by the evidence in the case." (p. 237)
While the decision has been criticized as contrary to the tendency
of the cases,"it has been followed by the New York Court of Appeals. 5
48123 Misc. 731, 205 N. Y. Supp. 836 (1924).
49213 App. Div. 855, 208 N. Y. Supp. 870 (ist. Dept. 1925).
r-223 App. Div. 12, 227 N. Y. Supp. 252 (1st. Dept. 1928), noted (1928) 28
COL. L. REv. 829.
5248 N. Y. 627, x62 N. E. 552 (1928).
52249 N. Y. 600, 164 N. E. 599 (1928).
53292 Pa. 228, 14o AtI. 900 (1928), 57 A. L. R. 463 (1929).
"Posner, Liability of the Trustee under the Corporate Indenture, (1928) 42 HARV.
L. REv. 198, 209.
"See, Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260, 266, 174 N. E. 648, 649
(1931), supra note 43.
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And in Newhall v. Norristown Trust Co.M the mortgage absolved
the trustee from any duty with respect to the disposition of the
proceeds of the sale of the bonds.and contained the customary
form of exculpatory clause. The trustee was held not liable to the
bondholders for losses occasioned by the mortgagor companywrong-
fully delivering bonds to contractors who failed to perform their
contract for extensions.
In Bell v. Scranton Trust Co. 57 the mortgage provided that the trus-
tee should not incur any liability by reason of any loss arising from
the failure of the company to keep the mortgaged premises insured.
The property was destroyed by fire and an action was brought by
a committee of bondholders against the trustee for its failure to en-
force an alleged covenant in the mortgage as to fire insurance.
Judgment went in favor of the defendant for the reason that the
covenant declared upon was not in the mortgage. The exculpatory
clause was held to be a further ground to support the judgment.
Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co.58 is a leading case.5 9 It was an action
for damages against the trustee for alleged breach of trust duty. A
separate department of the trust company knew that the mortgagor
was in default. Yet the trustee released certain property from
the mortgage. The usual form of exculpatory clause was held, under
the circumstances of the case, to relieve the trustee. Although the
trustee was technically negligent, the release was not gross negli-
gence.60
The question in Stothers v. Toronto General Trusts Corp.61 was
whether the trustee was justified in paying to the mortgagor, upon
progress certificates of an engineer, the proceeds of the sale of the
bonds without ascertaining if other securities had been disposed of
by the mortgagor. The trustee was protected from liability by the
exculpatory clause in the deed.
Whicher v. National Trust Co. is an instructive case. It was an
action by a bondholder against the trustee for alleged breach of duty
5628o Pa. 195, 124 Atl. 337 (1924). 5726I Pa. 28, 103 Ati. 1o9 (1918).
5'25o Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918), certiorari denied 248 U. S. 564, 39 Sup. Ct. 9
(1918).
59See Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260, 267, 174 N. E. 648, 65o
(1931).,6 The court followed Black v. Wiedersheim, 143 Fed. 359 (C. C. Pa., 1906)
and Tuttle v. Gilmore, supra note 4o.
6144 Ont. L. Rep. 432 (1918). Hodgins, J. dissented (p. 469). His dissent
was based (p. 48o) upon the conclusions of the majority of the Court of Appeal
in Whicher v. National Trust Co., 22 Ont. L. Rep. 46o (i9io). However, the
Privy Council had reversed that decision, L. R. 1I912 ] A. C. 377. and apparently
the Court was not aware of such reversal, see infra note 65.
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in not purchasing at the lowest price a number of bonds to be retired
by operation of the sinking fund. The trustee rejected plaintiff's
lower tender of a small number of bonds and accepted a tender of
a large number at a higher price. As a result the trustee retired a
greater number of bonds with the available funds. The trust deed
contained an exculpatory clause. 2 At the trial Riddell, J. found
that the trustee had acted honestly and reasonably and was pro-
tected from liability by the Trustee Act and the exculpatory clause.68
This decision was reversed by a majority of three to two in the Court
of Appeal for Ontario." Subsequently the Privy Council restored
the judgment of the trial court for the reason that the trustee did
not commit any breach, finding it unnecessary to consider whether
the trustee's duty rested on contract or a trust relation.6 5
In Hollister v. Stewart the mortgage contained a provision that
neither of the trustees "shall be answerable except for his own willful
default or misconduct." The mortgagor company was in default.
Upon the advice of a majority of the bondholders, the trustees
released the company from its obligations to the bondholders, defer-
red payment on the bonds, and consented to a new mortgage. There
was an express finding that the trustees, though acting erroneously,
proceeded in good faith. The General Term modified the judgment
below; and, in so doing, directed that judgment should go against
the trustees as such and not personally.6 This was approved by the
Court of Appeals.6 7 In delivering the opinion68 of the General Term,
Daniels, J., after referring to the exculpatory clause, said:
"This language contemplated their [trusteesi exoneration
from liability for mere error of judgment in the management
of their trust. There was no willful default or misconduct
in the payments made upon the preferred bonds, but they were
made under an error of judgment as to their legal rights and
duties, and it was the object of this clause in the mortgage to
relieve them from liability for the results of such misjudgment.
62The terms of the clause do not appear in the reports. However, through the
courtesy of the trustee, the original deed was consulted by the writer and it
contains the following provision: "The trustee shall not be answerable for any
act, default, neglect or misconduct of any of its agents or employees by it ap-
pointed or employed in connection with the execution of any of the said trusts,
nor in any other manner answerable or accountable under any circumstances
whatsoever except for bad faith."
6319 Ont. L. Rep. 6o5, 612 (1909).
6422 Ont. L. Rep. 460 (I9IO). 5L. R. (1912) App. Cas. 377, 383.
637 Hun (N. Y.) 645 (1885).
67111 N. Y. 644, ig N. E. 782 (1889).
sUnreported. The extract quoted was taken from a copy of the Papers on
Appeal, pp. 214, 221.
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That is the fair import and effect of the language employed, and
it should be so construed as to secure that end."
Finally, in Woodruff v. Freehold Trust Co. 9 the trustee received
a sum sufficient to redeem all the outstanding bonds. The trust
indenture was silent as to the duty imposed upon the trustee with
respect to the fund so received. The trustee deposited the money
with a bank then in good credit. Thereafter the bank failed and
complainant, the owner of several bonds called for redemption,
filed a bill for a decree for payment by the defendant trustee of the
sum due upon the redemption of her bonds. The bill was dismissed;
the immunity clause being construed as limiting the trustee's "respon-
sibility in matters of judgment and discretion committed to it in
the execution of the trust imposed, so far as caring for the fund in
question when received was concerned."
Thus, an exculpatory clause will not be construed as intended to
exempt a trustee from liability if it transcends its powers as defined
by the trust indenture. The purpose of an exculpatory clause in the
indenture in which the duties of the trustee are defined is to limit
the responsibility of the trustee in matters of judgment and discre-
tion in the exercise of the defined powers.
B. DEPOsIT AGREEME -TS
While the rules of law applicable to ordinary trusteeship are not
entirely applicable,70 the members of a committee of bondholders
are, in a broad sense, trustees for the benefit of the bondholders and
are bound to protect their interests in every reasonable way.7 ' The
nature and extent of the powers of a bondholders' committee are
to be found in the instrument under which they undertake to act
on behalf of the bondholders and not in any statute or rule of the
common law.7 2 The agreement with the bondholders is both a defini-
"9112 N. J. Eq. 405, 164 Atl. 411 (1933). There are several additional cases in
which the exculpatory provisions in corporate mortgages were held effectual
under circumstances similar to the cases already discussed. Ainsa v. Mercantile
Trust Co., I74 Cal. 5o4, 163 Pac. 898 (1917); Partridge v. American Trust Co.,
211 Mass. 194, 97 N. E. 925 (1912); Diggs v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 112 Md.
50,75 Atl. 517 (i91o); Black v. Wiedersheim, 143 Fed. 359 (C. C. Pa., 19o6);
Bauernschmidt v. Maryland Trust Co., 89 Md. 507, 43 Atl. 790 (1899).
7"Thompson v. Hays, ii F. (2d) 244, 248 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
7'Cox v. Stokes, I56 N. Y. 491, 507, 51 N. E. 316 (1898); Habirshaw Electric
Cable Co., v. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co., Inc., 296 Fed. 875, 881 (C. C. A. 2d,
1924), certiorari denied 265 U. S. 587 (1924), 43 A. L. R. 1035 (1926); Hart v.
Wiltsee 19 F. (2d) 903, 9o9-91o (C. C. A. Ist, 1927).
72Carter v. First National Bank, 128 Md. 581, 587, 98 Atl. 77 (1916); Ginty v.
Ocean Shore R. Co., 172 Cal. 31, 34, 155 Pac. 77, 79 (1916).
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tion and limitation of the powers of the committee. Bonds in the
hands of the committee are impressed with a trust by virtue of the
deposit agreement" and a fiduciary relation exists between the
depositors and the members of the committee.7 4 Such acommittee
is held to strict accountability, and in construing the terms of the
deposit agreement and the powers entrusted to the committee, in
case of doubt, a construction most favorable to the bondholders
will be followed.75
The liability of a committee of bondholders has been considered
in a few cases, 76 and the deposit agreement usually contains an
exculpatory clause for the purpose of limiting the liability of the
committee. In Industrial & General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod77 the committee
had the right to construe the agreement and their construction was
made final by force of the provisions of the deposit agreement. The
court held that the provision was no protection to the committee
since its action was not taken in good faith. The court said:
"The power to construe and the engagement that the con-
struction shall be final mean that it shall be final if the members
of the committee act in good faith, but not otherwise. They
were, doubtless, protected from the outcome of errors of judg-
ment and honest mistakes, but good faith is the standard,
erected by the law, by which all their acts and omissions are
to be judged."
In Thompson v. Hays78 a deposit agreement provided that the
members of the bondhblders' protective committee should not
be liable for error of judgment or mistake of law or fact, but only
for willful default. The committee fully advised the bondholders
73Peoria & E. Ry. Co. v. Coster, 97 Fed. 519, 520 (C. C. N. Y., 1899). Cf.
United Water Works Co. v. Omaha Water Co., 164 N. Y.4 I , 54,58 N. E. 58 (igoo);
United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. CO., 282 U. S. 311, 324, 51 Sup. Ct.
159. (931).
74Mawhinney v. Bliss, 1I 7 App. Div. 255, 262, 102 N. Y. Supp. 279 (Ist. Dept.
1907), afd x89 N. Y. 501, 81 N. E. I169 (1907). Cf. Parker v. New England
Oil Corp., 13 F. (2d) 158, 179 (D. C. Mass., 1926), reversed on other grounds,
19 F. (2d) 9o3 (C. C. A. Ist, 1927); Keane v. Moffly, 217 Pa. 240,242, 66 Atl. 319
(1907).
75Industrial & General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, 18o N. Y. 215,225, 73 N. E. 7 (1905).
78Livingston v. Falk, 217 App. Div. 360, 217 N. Y. Supp. 131 (Ist. Dept.,
1926), noted (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 95; see also Bryan, Reorganization Com-
mnittees-Individual Liability, (1926) 12 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) I; (Note) Bondhold-
ers' Committees in Reorganization, (1927) 41 HARV. L. REv. 377; Rodgers,
Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders' Reorganization, (1928) 42
HARv. L. REv. 899, 925.
"Supra, note 75.
7811 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
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of the situation at stated and proper times. There was no charge of
fraud. The handling of the property by the committee was not
satisfactory to the court, but the conduct of the committee evidenced
a mistake of judgment or policy. However, the committee was not
guilty of willful default, as defined by the court.
And in Dreyfus v. Old Colony Trust Co.7 9 the committee, in good
faith and upon the advice of counsel, gave instructions to the deposi-
tory respecting transfers of securities. The exculpatory clause
was held a protection to the committee under the circumstances.
Again in Van Siclen v. Bartol ° the members of the bondholders'
committee made mistakes. The agreement expressly relieved them
from liability, except willful malfeasance or gross negligence. The
committee attempted to arrange a plan of reorganization but was
unsuccessful. The court dismissed the charge of gross negligence
and found that "of willful malfeasance-a conscious, deliberate
breach of trust-there was certainly none."
Finally, in Riker v. Also p8 the agreement provided that none of
the committee of bondholders should be responsible for the act or
omission of any of his associates, or for any act not willfully or grossly
negligent. The court stated82 that this "merely express6s what a
court of equity would hold in the absence of such a provision."8
C. DEEDS AND WILLS
The protection afforded the trustee by an exculpatory clause in
deeds and wills, where the relation is one of ordinary trust, has been
considered in many cases in the Americans' and English courts.u
In Digney v. Blanchard16 the trustee of an unincorporated association
existing under a declaration of trust-a so-called Massachusetts
trust 7-was to be liable only "for the result of his own gross negli-
gence or bad faith." The trustee, without authority in the declara-
'79218 Mass. 546, I06 N. E. I54 (1914).
8095 Fed. 793 (C. C. Pa., 1899).
8127 Fed. 251, 259 (C. C. N. Y., I886).
82The cases cited by Circuit Judge Wallace involved co-trustees and the
question in each was the liability, if any, of a trustee for acts of his co-trustee.
See Bogert, The Liability of an Inactive Co-trustee, (1920) 34 HARV. L. REv. 483,
498.
8Cf. Dawson v. Clarke, 18 Ves. 247, 34 Eng. Rep. 311 (1811).
'Bogert, The Liability of an Inactive Co-trustee, (1920) 34 HARV. L. REv. 483,
498.
'Cassels, The Effect of Indemnity Clauses upon Trustees' Liability for Willful
Default and Neglect, (1889) 9 CAN. L. T. i.
8226 Mass. 335, 115 N. E. 424 (1917).
'
7Hildebrand, The Massachusetts Trust, (1925) 59 Am. L. REv. 17.
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tion of trust, erected buildings on lands in'which the trust had no
interest. The trustee was held not to be exonerated from liability.
The court said: "
"Whatever may be the extent of the liability of a trustee
justifying under this clause, wedo nqt construe it as affording
him protection from a willful and intentional breach of trust,
committed, by acting plainly beyondlis powers." (p. 337).
And in Holmes v. McDonald88 the trustees of an association were
held liable in spite of a broad exculpatory clause. They were held
liable for failure-to bring their business sagacity to bear upon their
duties and withdraw a deposit in advance of the failure of the deposi-
tary, which-they ..would have known was unreliable, if they had
actively attended to their duties, There .w.as, no evidence that the
trustees were guilty of willful, corrupt misconduct. But the terms
of the agreement were violated in..lending the money on deposit
instead of.investing it.
In Drosi. v. Brereton89 the trustees were the grantors and volun-
tarily created a trust for the benefit of a bankrupt neighbor and his
wife. The trust deed contained an exculpatory clause which pro-
vided that the trustees should not be responsible for "'the.insufficiency
or deficiency in tlhe title or value of any security * * * nor for any
other misfortune, loss or damage which might happen * * * except
*** through their own willful default." The trustees lent trust
funds on a second mortgage and the principal was lost. Upon the
suit of the widow, the trustees were held liable, since it was a breach
of trust to lend the money on a second mortgage. Sir John Romilly,
the Master of the Rolls, characterized the case as a "very painful" one.
And in Knox v. Mackinnon"0 the trust deed empowered the trustees
to lend out trust funds on such security as they might think proper,
88226 Ill. 169, 80 N. E. 714 (1907).
81x5 Beav. 221, 51 Eng. Rep. 521 (185I). See also, Brumridge v. Brunridge,
27 Beav. 5, 54 Eng. Rep. 2 (1858) where the Master of the Rolls, Sir John Romilly,
in holding the exculpatory clause in a deed did not exonerate a trustee from the
consequences of.a misapplication of funds, although admittedly free from per-
sonal guilt or benefit, said at page 7: "This clause is constantly brought forward
to sanction the misapplication of trust moneys; but until it is provided, by the
instrument creating the trust, that the trustee shall be liable for no breach of
trust, provided he does not obtain a personal advantage, I shall not consider
the clause as giving a trustee the right or liberty of conniving at a breach of trust.
Even if an instrument containing such an inconsistent clause were brought before
me, I express no opinion on the result; but until it is, I cannot allow a trustee
to say that it is not his business to act properly in the performance of his duty
as trustee".
91L. R. 13 A. C. 753 (x888).
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and declared that the trustees were not to be responsible for "omis-
sions, errors, or neglect of management." In spite of the exculpatory
clause, the trustees were held liable because they had not brought
to the management "the same care and diligence which a man of
ordinary prudence would have exercised in his own concerns." In
delivering his opinion, Lord Watson said:
"I see no reason to doubt that a clause conceived in these or
similar terms, will afford a considerable measure of protection
to trustees who have bona fide abstained from closely superin-
tending the administration of the trust, or who have com-
mitted mere errors of judgment whilst acting with a single
eye to the benefit of the trust, and of the persons whom it con-
cerns. But it is settled * * * that such a clause is ineffectual to
protect a trustee againstthe consequences of * * * gross negligence
on his part, or of any conduct which is inconsistent with bona
fides. I think it is equally clear that the clause will afford no pro-
tection to trustees, who from motives, however laudable in them-
selves, act in plain violation of the duty which they owe to the
individuals beneficially interested in the funds which they
administer. I agree with the opinion expressed by Lords Ivory,
Gillies, and Murray in Seton v. Dawson, 4 Ct. Sess. Cas. 2d
Series, at p. 318, to the effect that 'clauses of this kind do not
protect against positive breach of duty'." (p. 765).
Finally, in Rae v. Meek9 the trustees made an investment on the
security of unfinished houses in course of erection relying upon the
valuation of an architect. The trust deed contained the common
form of exculpatory clause found in many trust deeds. The trustees
were held liable for a breach of duty and were not protected by the
exculpatory clause.
As early as 181i, Lord Eldon, in discussing the effect of excul-
patory clauses in wills, said" that "in effect this Court infuses such
a clause in every will, though not directed: it comes therefore to
little more than what a Court of Equity would have done without
any direction." In Moyle v. Moyle9" the will provided that the
trustees should not be answerable for "any loss or damage which
might happen without their willful default, or by the misfeasance,
failure or insolvency of any banker with whom the trust-monies
might be lodged for safe custody or investment or otherwise in the
execution of the trusts." Nevertheless the trustees were held liable
for breach of trust, because they left certain funds on deposit for
nearly a year with bankers who failed. And in Pride v. Fooks4
11L. R. 14 A. C. 558 (1889).
9Dawson v. Clarke, 18 Ves. 247, 254, 34 Eng. Rep. 311 (i8xi).
132 Russ. & M. 710, 39 Eng. Rep. 565 (1831).
942 Beav. 430, 48 Eng. Rep. 1248 (184).
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the will provided that the testamentary trustee "should only be
accountable for losses happening through his willful neglect and mis-
conduct." Yet the trustee was held liable, though he was not guilty
of any furtive motive or personal gain, for having invested funds
in a mortgage when the will directed him to invest in government
bonds. The exculpatory clause was not a protection against a breach
of trust.
However, in Stretton v. Ashmal19 it was held that the exculpatory
clause limited the broad discretionary power of the testamentary
trustee in selecting securities. The Vice-Chancellor said:
"The meaning of that [exculpatory] clause is that, if the trus-
tees exercised an honest and fair discretion, and invested upon
securities of sufficient value, then any loss arose from subsequent
diminution of value, the trustees should not be affected."
(pp. 11-12).
Wilkins v. Hogg9" was a case arising on trusts created by a will
which contained an unusual exculpatory clause since it authorized
the trustees to pay over to their co-trustees without being responsible
for misapplication, each trustee being answerable only for losses
occasioned by his own default. The exculpatory clause was held a ,-
sufficient shield to protect the trustees. Vice-Chancellor Stuart said:
"The argument has proceeded on the assumption that the
usual indemnity clause amounts to nothing; that it never receives
a literal interpretation; but that this Court will look generally
at the conduct of the trustees, and, for any carelessness, or any
act that a prudent man ought not to have committed, will visit
the trustee who has been guilty of such acts, whatever may be
the language of the will. That is not the law of this Court."
(p. I 8).
On appeal, Lord Westbury, the Lord 'Chancellor, said 7 that he
"should have been glad to find a case warranting the con-
clusion, that a duty having been undertaken, any words qualify-
ing that duty should be nugatory; but such could not be
held to be the law., It was perfectly competent to a testator to
define what should be the incidents to the duty of a trustee, as
long as he kept within the bounds of the law. This clause
excluded the possibility of any liability, except for actual
misappropriation."
It would seem that the ratio decidendi of the case is that the excul-
patory clause in express terms shielded the trustees from any liability
for the very act of which complaint was made.98
953 Drew 9, 61 Eng. Rep. 8o4 (1854).
83 Giff. II6, 66 Eng. Rep. 346 (i86x). 978 Jur. (N. S.) 25 (I861).
98Cf. Matter of Howard, i io App. Div. 6I, 65-66, 97 N. Y. Supp. 23 (2d. Dept.
9o5), ai'd I85 N. Y. 539, 77 N. E. 1189 (I9o6), infra note ioo.
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There are two classes of cases in which exculpatory clauses have
been considered:
(a) Where the trustee has been charged with an act which is per se
a breach of trust; that is, where he has committed an act involving
the trust estate in loss which is not authorized by the terms of the
instrument defining his powers. In such cases the courts have held
that, as a matter of law, he is guilty of willful misconduct and that
an exculpatory clause will not protect the trustee from the conse-
quences of his act. As soon as the trustee goes beyond the terms
of his authority he is guilty of willful misconduct in contemplation
of law.
(b) The second class of cases is that involving claims based on
acts which are not in and of themselves a breach of trust, but the
assertion of a breach is predicated on the manner or time of the
exercise of a discretionary power granted to the trustee. In this
class the courts have uniformly held the exculpatory clause is a
protection.
Matter of Olmstead99 brings out clearly the distinction between
the two classes of cases. By the will the trustee was directed to
invest the trust funds in bonds and mortgages on unincumbered
improved real estate; and the will provided that the trustee should
not be liable for any loss to the estate, unless such loss be caused
by his personal gross neglect or willful misfeasance. The trustee
made a proper investment. When the mortgage became due, the
trustee extended payment without any one becoming personally
liable on the bond. Thereafter a fire seriously damaged the mort-
gaged building. The trustee collected the insurance money and
turned it over to the owner of the property upon an oral understand-
ing that the latter should repair the building. The repairs were
never made and the trustee was unable to recover the insurance
money from the owner. The mortgage was foreclosed, leaving a
deficiency. The trustee was not charged with the deficiency caused
by the extension of the time of payment of the mortgage without
requiring a responsible party to assume the payment of the bond.
The court said: "The utmost that can be said is that it was an
error of judgment to grant such an extension, which could not be
called gross neglect within the meaning of this provision of the
will."
As respects the act of the trustee in turning over the insurance
money to the owner in possession of the property, upon a mere verbal
9952 App. Div. 515, 66 N. Y. Supp. 212 (ist. Dept. i9oo), aff'd 164 N. Y. 571,
58 N. E. 9ogo (igoo).
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understanding that it should be used in the repair of the building,
the Court charged the trustee with the amount thus lost, saying:
"Here the will contained specific directions as to the securities
in which the trust estate should be invested, and certainly a
willful disregard of those directions would be gross neglect,
within the meaning of this term as used in the will. * * * What-
ever meaning may be given to this term 'gross neglect', as used
in the will, a payment of a portion of the trust fund to a person
not liable to pay a mortgage on real property, upon the under-
standing that he will use that money to repair a building upon
the trust estate, without taking any security for the per-
formance, of the agreement, is a violation of the authority
conferred upon the trustee."
In Matter of Mallon," two breaches by the trustees were involved.
The Surrogate relieved one trustee from liability for a large part
of the deficit'' but held him liable for another loss. Jenks, J., writing
for the Appellate Division, said:
"I think that the indemnity clause protected the trustee from
losseg which might be ascribed justly to his fall below the
standard prescribed by law for trustees, to his improvidence,
or carelessness or bad judgment and the like, but not from such
purblind folly as Howard showed after he learned of his fellow-
trustee's maladministration, which must have convinced any
man who took second thought either that Ferry was grossly
incompetent or utterly dishonest, for it must be remembered
that Ferry would not or could not explain this disappearance
of $30,000."
In the second class of cases it has been sought to charge the trustee
for what might be termed an abuse of the discretion vested in the
trustee. As previously stated, the exculpatory clause is generally
a protection to the trustee.1 12 However, in wills or ordinary trust
instruments, an exculpatory clause has never exempted a trustee
from liability for an act involving (a) negligence consciously com-'
mitted; (b) gross negligence; or (c) conduct unauthorized by law or
the trust instrument. The cases arising under the last group may
be further sub-divided into cases of: (i) Inaction or failure to secure
10043 Misc. 569, 89 N. Y. Supp. 554 (i9O4), aff'd sub. nom., Matter of Howard,
zo App. Div. 6I, 97 N. Y. Supp. 23 (2d. Dept. x9o5), aff'd x85 N. Y. 539, 77
N. E. II89 (I9O6).
10143 Misc. 569, 570, 89 N. Y. Supp. 554 (1904).
1
°'Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 140, 177 N. E. 397 (1931); Matter of United
States Trust Co., 189 App. Div. 75, 178 N. Y. Supp. 125 (2d. Dept. i199); Ander-
son v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 644 (1930), 72 A. L. R. 959 (1931); Note,
(i930) 30 COL. L. Rav. ii66. Contra: Matter of Jarvis, 2xo Misc. 5, i8o N. Y.
Supp. 324 (1920).
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the trust fund; (ii) Action outside the provisions of the'trust instru-
ment; (iii) Action outside of the rules imposed by the court of equity
upon trustees; or (iv). Postponement of performance of a duty beyond
a reasonable time.1 3  - - :. .....
As a general rule, when the powers of the trustee are discretionary,
equity will not intervene unless the trustee acts in'bad:faith, or in
abuse of his powers. Any-abuse of discretion upon the pdrt of a trus-
tee is clearly a matter for correction- in a'court of equity. '-No matter
how broad the discretion which may be bestowed upon' the trustee,
he is not relieved from "obedience to the great principles of equity
which are the life of every trust."'u' 4
D. MISCELLANEOUS BILATERAL AGREEMENT.S ..
The general law as to limiting tort liability by .contract is not
settled. The employer 'May not validly provide in the contract
of employment against liability for negligently injuring his em-
ployee.'0' While an ordinary bailee may limit his liability for negli-
gence, °0 the peculiar duties which a common carrier owes to the
public prevent it from validly contracting to limit its liability for
negligence. 0 7 Likewise. individuals and corporations engaged in a
103Cf. Matter of Jarvis, no Misc. 5i i8o N. Y. Supp. 324 (1920)..
"
4
'Cardozo, J. in Carrier.v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 125, 123 N. E. 135 (i9g9).
See also, Struthers Coal & Coke Co. v. Union Trust Co., 227 Pa. -29, 75 Atl.
986 (1go); Coltonv. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 32I, 8 Sup. qt. 1164 (x888); Electric
Management & Engineering Corp. v. United Power & Light Corp., i9 F. (2d)
311, 316 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); In re Smith, L. R. i Ch. Div. 71 (x896); Holcomb
v. Holcomb, i uN. J. Eq. 281, 290 (1857); Read v. Patterson, 44 N. J. Eq. 211,
222, 14 Atl. 49o (1888); Larkin v. Wikoff, 7S N. J. Eq. 462, 72 AtI; 98 aff'd 77
N. J. Eq. 589, 78 Atl. 11,34 (i9IO); Angell v. Angell, 28 R. I. 592, 598, 68 Atl. 538
(i9o8); Markle's Estate, 182 Pa. 378, 38 Ati. 612 (1897); Keeler v. Lauer, 73
Kan. 388, 393, 85 Pac. 541 (x9o6);- Matter of Van de Car; 49 Misc. 39, 42, 98
N. Y. Supp. 309 (i9O5); (Note) Control of Trustee's Discretion, (1929) r8 Ky.
L. J. 399.
lujohnston v. Fargo, 184 N. Y. 379, 77 N. E. 388 (I9G6) 7 L. R. A; (N. S.) 537
(1907).
'1Graves v. Davis, 235 N. Y. 315, x39 N. E. 280 (1923).
107Colton v. New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co., 27 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 2d,
1928). New York, contrary to most other jurisdictions, has sanctioned agree-
ments exempting carriers from liability for negligence. Nelson V: Hudson R. Co.,
48 N. Y. 498 (872); Cragin v. New York Central R. Co., 51 N. Y. 61 (1872).
The doctrine, however, was somewhat limited in Straus & Co: v, Canadian
Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564 (I93O). See also; Anderson v. Erie
R. R. Co., 223 N. Y. 277, i19 N. E. 557 (I918). Those jurisdictioins'*hich do not
recognize contracts -exempting one from liability for negligence, limit the rule
to a certain class of cases. Sante Fe, etc., R. Co. v. Grant Bros. Const. Co.,
228 U. S. 177, 33 Sup. Ct. 474 (1913).
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quasi public business cannot protect themselves by contract against
liability for willful misconduct or gross negligence.' 08 However, a
public service company may, in respect to a subordinate part of its
business, exempt itself from liability for damages by contractual
limitations, that are reasonable. Thus, -a telephone company may
contract against liability arising from errors or omissions in its direc-
tory of subscribers to its service.1°1 An exculpatory clause in a
lease which provided that the landlord was to be exempt from
liability either for his own negligence or the negligence of his agents
does not cpntravene public policy.'n0 And a bank may protect
itself against inadvertency or oversight in paying checks against
which a stop-payment order has been issued."' Finally, a commercial
agency may-limit its liability for loss caused by neglect in com-
municating information, except for gross mistakes and negligence 12
In addition to the cases already discussed defining willful default
and gross negligence, there are several additional cases defining the
terms.
1  I
While some courts have stated that a clause- in an assignment
for the benefit of creditors that the trustee shall be exonerated
except for gross neglect and willful misfeasance renders the deed void
as against creditors,114 other courts have held that since such language
merely expresses the legal liability of the assignee, it does not invali-
date the deed."' Nevertheless the creditors coming in under such
i°sWeld v. Postal-Telegraph-Cable Co., i99 N. Y. 88, 98, 92 N. E. 415 (1910).
"'Hamilton Emp. Service v. New York Telephone Co., 253 N. Y. 468, 171
N. E. 710 (193).
"'Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N. Y. 489, 18o N. E.
245 (1932), noted (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 139.
I"Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. r52, z67 N. E. 203 (1929).
nr v. Bradstreet Co., 17o App. Div. 294, 155 N. Y. Supp. 833 (ist.
Dept. 191S). See also, Xiques v. Bradstreet Co., 70 Hun. 334, 24 N. Y. Supp.
48 (Ist. Dept. x893), aff'd 141 N. Y. 605, 36 N. E. 740 (1894).
"'Thompson v. Hays, ii F. (2d) 244, 248 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Warren v.
Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (19o9); Spurr v. United States, 174 U. S.
728, 734 (1899); Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321, 325 (C. C. A. 3d.,
1918); Leeds City BreweryLtd. v. Plotts, L. R. [19251 Ch. Div. 532, 544; In re
Vickery, L..R. [1931] I Ch. Div. 572, 583; In re Young & Harston's Contract,
L. R. 31 Ch. Div. r68, 175 (x885).
26In re Birk & Johnson, 295 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924), certiorari denied
265 U. . 590(1924),; Mclntire v. Benson, 20 I1. 500 (1858); Hutchinson v.
Lord, I Wis. 286, 310 (1853); True v. Congdon, 44 N. H. 48, 56 (1862).
"'Scott v. Jones, 9 N. D. 55I, 84 N. W. 479 (19oo); Whipple v. Pope, 33 Ill.
334,338 (1864); Gordon v. Gordon, 59 Va: 387 (1868); Hennessy v. The Western
Bank, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 300 (1843); See also, O'Fallonv. Tucker, 13 Mo. 262 (185o);
Ashursts v. Martin, 9 Porter (Ala.) 566, 575 (1839); Baldwin v. Peet, 22 Tex. 7o8,
720 (z859).
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an assignment and claiming the benefit of its provisions are bound
by the stipulation upon which the trustee accepted the trust.11 6
Somewhat to the same effect is Babbitt v. Read.n 7 There the
corporate mortgage contained a provision that no recourse under
any obligation of the mortgage or of any bond or coupon should be
had against any stockholder of the mortgagor corporation. The
clause is one quite familiar in corporate mortgages, and, unless used
as a part of a scheme to defraud, is valid and not against public
policy. It is a fair and proper protection to the stockholders and
is binding upon the bondholders if they are properly apprised in
advance, since the purchaser of bonds usually looks to the security
of the mortgage, rather than the personal responsibility of the
individual stockholders." 8
CONCLUSION
There are certain cases that are effectually provided for by an
exculpatory clause. Nevertheless, there may exist others to which
that immunity, however extensive, will not apply. Running through
all the reported cases is a broad and inherent distinction, necessarily
existing in all cases, between, on the one hand, errors of judgment,
or casual negligence in small matters by employees, selected with
due care, in the administration and management of the trust-
that is, in acts performed by the trustee which are within the scope
of its powers; and, on the other hand, acts inconsistent with the
trust, or which amount to gross negligence or willful disregard of
the direct duties of the trustee. It is essential to ascertain and
determine whether the act complained of was an act within the
powers of the trustee, as distinguished from acts without or beyond
the scope of such powers.
There is some divergence of opinion respecting the various obliga-
tions of a trustee to the bondholders as to the affirmative duty
to preserve the security. There is little doubt that a trustee is
under the negative duty of refraining from impairing or destroying
the security, the retention of which constitutes the primary and
fundamental object of the trust indenture for the benefit of the bond-
holders.
'
6Omstead v. Herrick, i E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 310 (1852); Litchfield v. White,
7 N. Y. 438, 444 (1852).
117236 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 2d. 1916), certiorari denied 243 U. S. 648 (1917).
'
18To like effect, Marfield v. Cincinnati, etc., Traction Co., iii Ohio 139,
z44 N. E. 689 (1924); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 217 Fed.
588, 6oi (D. C. Wash., i914). See also Brown v. Eastern Slate Co., I34 Mass.
59o (1883). See Continental Corporation v. Gowdy et al., I86 N. E. 244 (Mass.
1933) noted (1933) 19 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY.
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It would seem that the courts eschew direct application of the
exculpatory clause,' whenever possible, by holding either (a) that
there was no breach of duty or negligence, 120 or. (b) that the trustee
was guilty of gross negligence or willful default and not protected by
the provision. However, the courts are careful not to deny that some
weight may be attributed to the exculpatory clause. It is a mistake
to assume that the exculpatory clause is discretionary and is little
more than what a court of equity would have done without any
such direction.
""cf. Estabrook v. International Trust Co., 227 Mass. 281, 287, ii6 N. E.
486 (1917); Tschetinian v.. City Trust Co., i86 N. Y.432, 436, 79 N. E. 4oi (19o6);
Anderson.v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432,447, 172 N. E. 644, 72 A. L. R. 959 (1930).
n0National Trust Co. v. Whicher, L. R. [1912] A. C. 377,,383; Matter of ClarL.
supra, note r02.
